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Allowing Employers to Discriminate in the Hiring Process
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Case
of Reyes-Gaona
I. Introduction
The H-2A program is one of several federal programs
providing U.S. employers with foreign workers when there is a
shortage of U.S. citizens available to fill the jobs. What rights
should these workers have? Do they deserve the same protections
that U.S. law provides to their American counterparts?
In Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Association,1 the Fourth
Circuit held that a foreign applicant's claim of discrimination
pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)2
failed because the claim was extraterritorial in nature and thus not
within the ADEA's scope.3 In other words, the court held that a
foreign national applying from abroad for a position within the
United States could not seek the ADEA's protection.
The implications of this narrow reading to plaintiffs such as
Reyes-Gaona are great. The facts of the case are unique in the
sense that neither Reyes-Gaona nor the Fourth Circuit itself could
surface a case "where the ADEA was interpreted to reach a
situation analogous to the case at bar."4 Thus, it is important to
analyze how the Fourth Circuit came to the conclusion that ReyesGaona's claim was extraterritorial in nature. This note will
undertake that analysis. The relevant facts of the case are
summarized in Part IIA.5 Sections B and C examine Reyes-Gaona
and its procedural history.6 Section A of Part III will briefly
1 250

F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10008 (Oct. 29,

2001).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
3 250 F.3d at 866-67.
4 Id. at 864. Of course, the facts are only unique in that such a fact pattern had not
been litigated previously. The reality is that most discrimination in hiring goes
unnoticed because most applicants are not explicitly told the reason for a denial of
employment as was Reyes-Gaona.
5 See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
6

See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
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explain the H-2A program,7 which motivated Plaintiff to apply for
employment. Next, "[s]ince this determination [of extraterritorial
scope] is necessarily 'a matter of statutory construction,' [one
must] begin with the text of the ADEA itself."8 Therefore, Section
B will look at the language of the ADEA and of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.' In Section C, the presumption of
extraterritoriality will be addressed.' ° Finally, Section D of Part
III will compare case law both before and after an important
amendment to the ADEA." In Part IV, the background law will
be contrasted with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Reyes-Gaona,
questioning whether the test for extraterritoriality has changed in
the labor context. 2 Part IV will ask how, if at all, precedent
supports such a change, and what the policy is regarding the
federal H-2A program. Finally, this Note will conclude that the
test for extraterritoriality in the labor context, in fact, remains
unchanged, and thus Reyes-Gaona should have been protected
from age discrimination in the hiring process.13
II. Statement of the Case
A. Statement of Fact
The plaintiff is a Mexican national who applied for
employment with the N.C. Growers Association (NCGA), a North
Carolina corporation that secures seasonal farm labor for
agricultural businesses through the federal H-2A temporary
foreign agricultural worker program. 4 Each year, Del-Al &
Associates, an agent of NCGA and a U.S. corporation, recruits
thousands of H-2A workers for NCGA through its office in
Mexico."'
7 See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.

8 Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 864.
9 See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 67-127 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 128-64 and accompanying text.
13

See infra Part V.

14 Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
2001 U.S. LEXIS 10008 (Oct. 29, 2001).
15 Id. Under the ADEA, the term "employer" includes any agent of a "person
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In May 1998, Del-Al rejected Reyes-Gaona's application for
employment in North Carolina because he was over forty years of
age. 16 If the plaintiff had previously been employed by NCGA,
the corporation's policy would have been waived and ReyesGaona would have been placed on the list of workers seeking
employment. 7 The plaintiff sued both NCGA and Del-Al,
claiming that they violated the ADEA by refusing to hire him.
B. The DistrictCourt Decision
The district court granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). 8 There, the court stated that a prima facie
case of employment discrimination entailed four elements:
A plaintiff must prove that (1) he is a member of the protected
class, that is, he is at least forty years old; (2) he was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) he
was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek or accept
applications from persons with his qualifications outside the
protected class.' 9
As to element (2), the court stated that in cases where the
applicant was a foreign national, Fourth Circuit precedent has held
that "being 'qualified' for the position is not determined by the
applicant's capacity to perform the job-rather, it is determined by
whether the applicant was an alien authorized for employment in
the United States at the time in question., 2' The court found that
Reyes-Gaona's case failed because he was not authorized to work
in the United States at the time of his application. 2'
engaged in any industry affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C.S. § 630(b).
16 Id. Reyes-Gaona was fifty-five at the time he applied. Reyes-Gaona v. N.C.
Growers Ass'n, No. 1:00CV00093, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14701, at *1 (M.D.N.C. June
22, 2000).
17 Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 863.
18 Reyes-Gaona, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14701, at *9.
19 Id. at *4 n.2 (citing Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir.
1995)).
20 Id. at *4 (quoting Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 187 (4th
Cir. 1999)).
21 Id. at *8.
A petition to import an alien as an H-2A worker... may not be approved ...
unless the petitioner has applied to the Secretary of Labor for a certification that
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Upon finding the plaintiff unqualified, the district court
declined to address Defendants' second argument that there was a
strong presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws, applicable here because it was a suit by a foreign national
applicant, residing outside of the United States.22 The Fourth
Circuit in Reyes-Gaona addressed the second argument.
C. The Fourth CircuitDecision
The Fourth Circuit determined that the plaintiff, Luis ReyesGaona, was not entitled to relief under the ADEA because he was
a foreign national, who applied in Mexico for employment in the
United States as a temporary farmworker.23 Such a position would
have given him "nonimmigrant" status and, thus, no right to live
or work in the United States beyond the temporary employment
for a particular employer.24 The Fourth Circuit ruled that on the
facts of the case, a judgment in the plaintiff's favor would require
extraterritorial application of the law in a manner that Congress
had not authorized in the ADEA.25 It is a "longstanding principle
of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States."' 26 This principle is trumped
only by an explicit congressional grant of extraterritoriality.
In conducting a statutory analysis of the ADEA, the court
found that prior to 1984, the ADEA was viewed as having no
extraterritorial application. 27 The 1984 amendment, the court
(A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, . . . and
(B) the employment of the alien in such labor ... will not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly
employed.
8 U.S.C. § 1188 (2000).
22 Id. at *9.

23 Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 10008 (Oct. 29, 2001).
24 8 U.S.C. §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 1184(c), 1188(i)(2) (1994). Workers must
return to their home country at the end of their employment period, which generally must
be less than twelve months. 20 C.F.R. § 655.100(c)(2)(iii) (2001).
25 Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 865.
26 Id. at 864 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) and
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
27 Id. at 866.
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determined, merely gave the statute extraterritorial application in
one instance-when a U.S. citizen works for a U.S. corporation
abroad.28 Thus, the 1984 amendment showed that Congress knew
how to give a statute extraterritorial reach when it desired, and
thus, Congress did not desire extraterritorial reach to cover the
facts of this case. 29 Because the statute did not explicitly cover
foreign nationals who applied from abroad, relief could not be
granted.3 °
The Fourth Circuit gave no weight to the fact that Plaintiff's
prospective workplace would have been in North Carolina.31 It
distinguished Reyes-Gaona from a line of cases, referred to as the
Thomas line of cases, where the circuit courts were in agreement
on a workplace test of extraterritoriality. 2 However, the court
stated that these cases
[stand] for the rather unremarkable proposition that before 1984
the ADEA had no extraterritorial application at all-not even for
U.S. citizens working abroad for American companies. The fact
that some suits were barred because of the international location
of the employee's workstation says nothing about whether a
foreign national can file suit under the ADEA merely because
the proposed workstation is in the United States.33

This deference to the situs of the application was detrimental
to Plaintiff's case. Further, the court expressed a concern that if
Plaintiff were covered by the ADEA, "such a broad reading of the
Act could have staggering consequences for American companies"
who would be subject to suit because of the "simple submission of
a resume abroad" from "millions of foreign34 nationals who file an
overseas application for U.S. employment.
Finally, Judge Motz, in a concurrence, said that certain post1984 authority cited by Reyes-Gaona and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), as amicus curiae, merely

28

Id. at 865.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 865-66.

32

Id. at 864-65. See infra note 67.

33

Id. at 866.

34 Id.
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presented "the reverse situation."35 That is, their precedent dealt
with foreign nationals within the United States applying for
positions outside the United States, whereas Reyes-Gaona was a
foreign national applying outside for a position inside.36 "The fact
that the ADEA did not apply in those cases does not compel the
conclusion that it does apply to this one. 3 7
Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, asserting that the Fourth Circuit applied a test for
determining extraterritoriality that turned on the place-of-decision
for hiring rather than turning on the location of the workplace.
Other circuit courts, Plaintiff asserted, have relied on the
workplace test in determining whether a claim demands
extraterritorial application of the law. Plaintiff's petition for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied.38
III. Background Law
A. The H-2A FederalProgram
The H-2A program, given slight mention by the Fourth
Circuit, is a federal visa program set out in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 39 which "facilitate[s] the process of U.S.
employers going abroad to recruit and hire foreign nationals to
work in the United States in temporary seasonal jobs. 4 ° Other
federal programs contained in this Act include H-2B and H-1B
programs.4 ' The former pertains to non-agricultural workers; 42 the

35 Id. at 867 (Motz, J., concurring).
36 Id. at 864-65.
37 Id. at 867 (Motz, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
38 250 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, No. 00-1963, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
10008 (Oct. 29, 2001).
39 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).

40 Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers
Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1963) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
41 8 U.S.C.

§§

1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

42 See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b). The H-2B program is used mainly by U.S.
employers engaged as forestry contractors and by East Coast seafood packers.
Appellant's Petition at 19, Reyes-Gaona (No. 00-1963) (on file with the North Carolina

Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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latter involves "specialty occupations."4 3

One cannot enter the

country on any of these visas unless there is a shortage of qualified
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent resident immigrants to fill the
positions.4a Further, a requirement of these programs is that
employment of aliens "will not adversely affect the

. . .

working

conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

45

B. The ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
1. The ADEA
In an effort "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age" and "to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment," 46 Congress enacted the ADEA,
making it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual .

.

. because of such individual's age.""

An "employee" is defined as "an individual employed by any
employer., 48 The Act was amended in 1984, 49 adding the
following language to the definition of "employee": "The term
43 Specialty occupations require "(A) theoretical and practical application of a body
of highly specialized knowledge, and (B) [the] attainment of a bachelor's or higher
degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent)." 8 U.S.C. §1 184(i)(1). See also §
1 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 1182(m) (2001) (Requirements for Admission of Nonimmigrant
Nurses During Five Year Period), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(n) (Labor Condition Application).

See supra note 21.
45 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(B) (pertaining to H-2A workers).
See also §§
1182(n)(1)(A)(ii) (pertaining to H-1B workers); 1182(m)(2)(A)(ii) (pertaining to H-IC
workers).
46 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
44

§ 623(a)(1).
48 § 630(f). Although not applicable in this case, the definition of "employee"
excludes:
any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any
State ... or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal
staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.
47

Id.
49 Congress amended ADEA by passing the Older Americans Act Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1767. In § 802, 98 Stat. 1792, the protection of the
ADEA was extended to U.S. citizens employed abroad by American corporations or
their subsidiaries. An exception exists if application of the ADEA would violate the law
of the other country where the workplace is located. § 802(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792.
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'employee' includes any individual who is a citizen of the United
States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign
country."5° The amendment did not apply retroactively. 5'
2. Title VII
52
The Supreme Court in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645' did not apply
extraterritorially to cover Americans working abroad for U.S.
corporations (or foreign corporations controlled by U.S.
corporations).54 Although a Title VII case, Arabian remains
relevant not only because it confirms this principle of
extraterritoriality but because it does so in the employment law
context. "With a few minor exceptions, the prohibitions of [the
ADEA] are in terms identical to those of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 except that 'age' has been substituted for 'race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."'' 55 Thus, "analogies to
Title VII cases are often helpful in age discrimination cases. 56
C. What is the presumption againstextraterritoriality?
The holding of Arabian demonstrates a strong concern about
violating the generally accepted principle of international law that
one country cannot impose its labor standards on another. 57 "It is a
long standing principle of American law 'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 58 From the
briefs and oral argument in Arabian, it is apparent that the main
50

§ 802(a), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (incorporating amendment).

51 See Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The
amendment.., does not apply retroactively .....
52 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
53 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000e- 17 (1994)).
54 Arabian, 499 U.S. at 246-47. Plaintiff was a naturalized U.S. citizen, hired in
Houston, transferred to Saudi Arabia, and allegedly discriminatorily discharged. He was
not protected by Title VII because the Court held that the law did not apply
extraterritorially to protect U.S. citizens working abroad for U.S. companies.
55 Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972).
56 Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1973).

57 Arabian,499 U.S. at 248.

58 Id. (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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concern was that if the definition of "employer" were read broadly
to include employers abroad, such an interpretation would
necessitate application of this U.S. law to foreign employers
abroad who employed U.S. citizens. 59 This would be an
extraterritorial application of the law, which was not explicitly
intended.6°
In Arabian, the Court rejected the EEOC's argument that a
negative inference could reasonably be drawn from Title VII's
alien exemption provision in order to cover U.S. citizens working
abroad for U.S. employers. 6' The exemption provides that the
statutes "shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State. 62 According to the
EEOC, "[i]f Congress believed that the statute did not apply
extraterritorially, it would have had no reason to include an
exemption for a certain category of individuals employed outside
the United States. 63
Following the decision in Arabian, Title VII was amended to
account for and protect any U.S. citizen working abroad for a U.S.
company or a company controlled by a U.S. company. 4 This
amendment was similar to the amendment made in 1984 to the
ADEA.65
Due to the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, the
court in Reyes-Gaona affirmed the principle developed in Title
VII cases that "statutes affording protection from employment

Id. at 255.
The Supreme Court states, for example, that even the EEOC would not contest
that Title VII could not be applied to a U.S. citizen working for a French employer in
France. Id.
61 Id.
59

60

62 Id. at 253 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1).
63 Arabian, 499 U.S. at 253 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 12-13, Arabian (No. 891838)).
64 "Effective November 21, 1991, see Pub. L. 102-166, Title I, § 109(a), 105 Stat.
1077 (1991), Title VII was amended to make it applicable to United States citizens
employed abroad. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) ('With respect to employment in a foreign
country, such term [employee] includes an individual who is a citizen of the United
States.')." Gantchar v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 93 C 1457, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3910, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1995).
65 See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a),
98 Stat. 1792 (1984).
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discrimination . . . apply to foreign nationals who are legally
employed in the United States."66
D. Case Law
1. Pre-Amendment ADEA Cases
Before the additional language became a part of the statute, a
line of cases, referred to in Reyes-Gaona as the Thomas line of
cases, 67 established a workplace test for ADEA extraterritoriality.
For example, in Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc.,6 s the plaintiff worked
thirty-three years for his employer, the latter part of his
employment being in Europe. 69 He was eventually discharged for
what he claimed to be pretextual reasons and filed an age
discrimination claim with the EEOC.7 ' The plaintiff argued that
his claim was covered by the ADEA because the discharge
decision had been made in New York.7 ' The Third Circuit
rejected the plaintiff's reasoning.
It held that the ADEA
incorporated the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which provides that the Act shall not apply to
66 Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 867 (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,
95 (1973) ("Title VII was clearly intended to apply with respect to the employment of
aliens inside any State.")). The court in Reyes-Gaona also affirmed the court's decision
in O'Loughlin v. PritchardCorp. that the ADEA "in general protects noncitizens of the
United States from unlawful discrimination." Id. (citing O'Loughlin v. Pritchard Corp.,
972 F. Supp. 1352, 1363-64 (D. Kan. 1997)). Further, the court in Hartman v. Wick, a
case concerning women who applied for employment with or who were currently
employed by the U.S. Information Agency, stated that the plaintiff class included nonresident aliens who applied for jobs with the Agency to be performed in the United
States and "[niothing in Title VII's language, or its legislative history, supports exclusion
of aliens employed in the United States from the Act's scope." 678 F. Supp. 312, 325
(D.D.C. 1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 2391 (1964),
reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2393).
67 In Thomas, the plaintiff began working for a North Carolina company, Brown &
Root, Inc., at the age of fifty-six. Thomas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279, 280 (4th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam). After several years, he was transferred to Scotland and then to
Rotterdam, where he was fired. Id. He testified that the London office told him that he
was being discharged because he was too old. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that the
ADEA could not be applied extraterritorially to cover his discharge overseas. Id. at 281.
68 728 F.2d 607, 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
69

Id. at 608.

70

Id.

71 Id. at 608 n.4.
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anyone employed in a workplace outside the United States.7 2 In
the Third Circuit rejected the "place of decision"
other words,
73
theory.
Just months after Cleary, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the
Cleary court and every court that had considered the question of
extraterritorial application.74 In Zahourek v. Arthur Young &
Co.,75 Zahourek was an American certified accountant, working
for an American company that had offices all over the world.
Zahourek worked primarily in other countries and was eventually
terminated in Honduras. 76 In response to Zahourek's ADEA
claim, the Tenth Circuit held, "the Act does not apply to the
termination of employment of an American citizen by an
American employer where, as here, the 'workplace' is in
Honduras.,, 77 The court also commented,
Zahourek would escape the general rule above stated by
claiming, alternatively, that this is not really a case of alleged
age discrimination occurring in Honduras, but in reality is an
instance where he was denied transfer from outside the United
States to employment within the United States. However....
"[t]he discriminating effect was on Zahourek's place of
employment-Honduras." 78
Two years after Cleary and Zahourek, the Fifth Circuit held
that a plaintiff was not covered under the ADEA due to its lack of
In S.F. DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter
extraterritorial reach.
Textron,7 9 the plaintiff was fired at the age of sixty-five in the
company's Canada office.8° The court found that five circuit
courts 8' had already decided this issue, resulting in a denial of
72

Id. at 608 (citing Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1982)).

73

Id. at 610 n.6.

74 Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827, 828 (10th Cir. 1984).
75
76

Id.
Id.

77 Id. at 828-29.

78 Id. at 829 (quoting the district court's decision, 567 F. Supp. 1453, 1457 (D.
Colo. 1983)).
79 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1986).
80 Id.

81 See Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a
plaintiff working in France who was forced to retire due to French law could not claim
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coverage under the ADEA prior to the 1984 amendment.8 2 As
before, the court applied a workplace test for extraterritoriality.
Because the plaintiff's workplace was in Canada, he was not
covered by the ADEA. Further, the court found that the language
of § 630(f) of the ADEA, as amended, must have added something
that was not already in the Act, i.e., limited extraterritorial reach.83
2. Hiring Cases
While most of the pre-amendment cases deal with the ADEA
and its prohibition against discriminatorily firing a worker, Lopez
v. Pan Am World Services,84 is similar to Reyes-Gaona in that it

concerns a hiring decision. In Lopez, the Eleventh Circuit was
asked to decide whether a U.S. citizen, who applied for

protection under the ADEA prior to 1984); Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d
554 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that because German law required retirement at the age of
sixty-five, Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen working in Germany, was not protected by the
ADEA); Zahourek, 750 F.2d 827, 828-29 (holding that the ADEA "does not apply to the
termination of employment of an American citizen by an American employer if the
'workplace' is" abroad); Thomas, 745 F.2d 279 (holding that there was no protection for
a plaintiff who was eventually fired abroad after having been hired in the United States
and later transferred abroad); Cleary, 728 F.2d 607 (holding that the geographic scope of
the ADEA was limited to the United States and since Plaintiffs place of employment
was outside the United States, the ADEA did not apply to him). In addition, Belanger v.
Keydril Co., 596 F. Supp. 823, 825 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985),
held that
regardless of whether the employer made its termination decision through its
personnel in the United States or abroad, the Federal ADEA simply does not
apply if the employee was working in a foreign country. If Congress believed
that the situs of the employer's decision was the determining factor, then it
would have clearly said so. Instead, Congress believed that the workplace of
the employee should be the determining factor.
Id. at 825.
82 S.F. DeYoreo, 785 F.2d at 1283.
Id. But see Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559-60 (rejecting Plaintiffs claim but stating
that "the legislative history of the 1984 amendment leaves totally obscure whether the
amendment was meant to change the law, to state more clearly the original meaning of
the law, or perhaps just to limit the extraterritorial application of the Act (to American
citizens employed by American corporations and their subsidiaries in countries that do
not have inconsistent laws) .... ) (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-1037, at 49 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3018, 3037 (describing the 1984 amendments to the agediscrimination laws as 'minor'); 130 CONG. REC. S11862, S11864 (daily ed. Sept. 26,
1984)).
84 813 F.2d 1118 (11 th Cir. 1987).
83
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employment with Pan Am World Services, a Florida corporation,
was covered under the ADEA when he was interviewed in the
United States, offered a job in Caracas, but subsequently had his
offer withdrawn because the client in Caracas had a mandated age
requirement that Lopez exceeded.85 Knowing that by this time,
there were six circuits 86 in agreement that an American employee
working overseas was not covered when terminated due to age,
Lopez sought to distinguish his case on the fact that he was an
applicant, not an employee. 87 All of the relevant acts, Lopez said,
occurred in the United States and there is a difference between the
place of hiring and the place of termination.88 The court
recognized that Lopez was presenting a "place of decision" theory
and responded:
Appellant emphasizes that in this case a United States
corporation decided in the United States not to hire a United
States citizen. Appellant disregards the fact that his job would
have been in Venezuela. To avoid the ADEA's extraterritorial
exemption, appellant attempts to distinguish between the place
of hiring and the place of termination. Such a distinction
appears to be a restatement of the "place of decision" theory.
Under this theory, the place the personnel decision is made
determines whether the ADEA is applicable .... "It is not the
place where the plaintiff is hired, however, nor even the place
where the termination decision is made that determines the
applicability of the ADEA ....Instead, it is the location of the
'work station' that is determinative. 89
3. Post-Amendment Cases
Post-amendment cases also offer an interesting perspective on
the nature of extraterritoriality and which test should be used to
determine if extraterritorial application is required. In Denty v.
SmithKline Beecham, 90 Denty worked in Philadelphia for the U.S.
85

Id. at 1118-19.

See cases cited supra note 81. The sixth case referred to is S.F. DeYoreo, 785
F.2d 1282.
87 Lopez, 813 F.2d at 1119.
86

88

Id. at 1120.

89

Id. (quoting Wolf v. J.1.
Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 863 (E.D. Wisc. 1985)).

90 109 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 820 (1997).
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subsidiary of a corporation that was found to be controlled by a
foreign parent corporation.91 Denty applied for a promotion to 92
a
position with the foreign corporation outside the United States.
Although this case was decided well after the 1984 amendment,
the court found that the controlling company was foreign and thus
Denty did not fall within the category of "U.S. citizen employed
by a U.S. company abroad." 93 Although the case turns on which
company is controlling, Denty shows that courts continue to look
to the prospective workplace to decide the issue of extraterritorial
application.94 The Third Circuit quoted the district court decision
with approval, stating:
The court specifically ruled that "the relevant work site is the
location of [the position for which the plaintiff applied], not the
location of Denty's employment at the time of the alleged
discrimination." The [district] court further opined that there
was no distinction in the ADEA between a "failure to hire" case,
in which the discrimination occurs in the country 95
where the job
site is located, and a "failure to promote" situation.
In Hu v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,9 6 the district
court agreed with the Denty court's view that there was no
difference between a "failure to hire" and a "failure to promote"
case. Hu was a "failure to hire" case. Hu sued a law firm for
refusing to hire him based on his age after applying to work in the
firm's Beijing and Hong Kong offices. 97 Although a legal resident
of the United States, Hu had Chinese citizenship. Accordingly,
91 Id. at 148. Although Denty started work for SmithKline French, a Pennsylvania
corporation, it subsequently merged with the Beecham Group plc, a British corporation,
and the resulting corporation, SmithKline Beecham was found to be the wholly-owned
American subsidiary. Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.

at 150.

94 Id. "[T]he employment decisions at issue involved Denty's application for

positions [abroad]. The relevant work site for ADEA purposes, therefore, is the location
of these positions. We find support for this conclusion in the fact that the language of
the ADEA does not distinguish between failure to hire and failure to promote situations."
Id. at 151 n.5.
95 Id. at 149 (quoting Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 907 F. Supp. 879, 884
(E.D. Pa. 1995)).
96 76 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
214 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2000).
97 Id. at 477.
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the district court found that Hu was not covered by the ADEA,
which only grants extraterritorial application in one instancewhere a U.S. citizen is working abroad for a U.S. company. 98 The
district court maintained "[p]laintiff's claim clearly calls for
extraterritorial application of the ADEA because the job which
plaintiff sought was to be performed in Beijing and Hong Kong.
The ADEA would apply to Hu, as a non-citizen, only if he sought
to work in the United States." 99 The district court held that Hu's
conducting his job search in the United States, Skadden's
employment interviews in New York, and the probability that
Skadden made the hiring decisions in New York did "not suffice
to render the employment within the United States for ADEA
purposes."' °
Along these lines, in another hiring discrimination case
decided by a district court under Title VII, the site of the
workplace seemed to be the determining factor in whether the
plaintiff's claim was of an extraterritorial nature. In Hartman v.
Wick,' O' a number of women who had either applied for
employment or who were currently employed by the U.S.
Information Agency, 102 claimed that they were discriminated
against in violation of Title VII. 03 The court held that the plaintiff
class, which included nonresident aliens, had applied for jobs to be
performed in the United States and were protected under Title VII
because neither its language nor legislative history supported the
exclusion of aliens employed in the United States." There is a
provision in Title VII that excludes aliens employed "outside any
State" from coverage.'0 5 It is this provision that the defendant in
Hartman10 6 argued also excluded those class members who were
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing Denty, 109 F.3d at 150, for the proposition that the place where the
job is to be performed constitutes the location of the work site for ADEA purposes).
101 678 F. Supp. 312 (D.D.C. 1988).
102

Id. at 319.

103

Id. at 325.

104 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 2391 (1964), reprinted
in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2393).
105 "This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment
of aliens outside any State... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1994).
106 See supra note 66 for discussion.
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neither citizens nor residents of the United States when they
applied for employment within the United States. 10 7 However, the
court stated that it was required to "give the language of civil
rights statutes 'broad and inclusive effect,' and . . . extend their
coverage to the outer limits permitted from a fair reading of the
statute .... ,,108
In Gantchar v. United Airlines,'0 9 Pan Am flight attendants,
who were not hired by United Airlines when it bought out Pan
Am, filed claims under both the ADEA and Title VII." ° The case
focused primarily on whether the work done by the flight
attendants was ambulatory in nature. If the work was found to be
ambulatory, then the amount of the work done abroad, in
international airspace, or in the United States would determine
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to these
federal statutes.111 The court found J.I. Case Co. and Pfeiffer
"instructive in that they indicate[d] (1) the primary focus should be
on the location of the work and (2) performing some work in the
United States does not preclude finding the work

107 Hartman, 678 F. Supp. at 325.
108 Id. In another district court decision involving a non-citizen and the ADEA, the
plaintiff was hired by the Pritchard Corporation and a few years later assigned to the
United Arab Emirates, but the Pritchard Corporation had difficulty in obtaining a visa for
the plaintiff. O'Loughlin v. Pritchard Corp., 972 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (D. Kan. 1997).
The United Arab Emirates placed an upper age limit on foreign national workers and the
plaintiff was over sixty. Id. at 1357-58. In general, the court's statutory interpretation
led it to conclude that non-citizens of the United States were protected from
discrimination because the statute said that an employer may not "discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994). "The phrase 'any individual' suggests
that the Act in general protects non-citizens of the United States .
0..."
O'Loughlin, 972
F. Supp. at 1363. However, the court found that such an interpretation did not mean that
a non-citizen was protected when working abroad because that "could potentially intrude
upon the domestic laws of other nations." Id. It also found that O'Loughlin's claim that
the defendant did not hire him for work inside the United States was valid. Id. at 1366.
109 No. 93 C 1457, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3910 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1995).

110 Id.
III Gantchar v. United Airlines, No. 93 C 1457, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5358, at *2
(N.D. 111.Apr. 20, 1995) ("[P]laintiffs confuse determining whether a statute applies
extraterritorially by applying the presumption against extraterritorial application of
statutes with the issue in this case, whether the work of the plaintiffs is in fact
extraterritorial in nature.").
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extraterritorial."' 12
Thus, although Gantchar could be
distinguished on the ground that it involved ambulatory workers,
the reliance on a workplace test is significant.
Finally, Iwata v. Stryker Corp."3 provides an example of the
literal interpretation that courts have given to Title VII and the
ADEA. Iwata was a Japanese citizen legally residing in the
United States,' 14 who took a job in the United States with
Matsumoto, the Japanese subsidiary of the American parent,
Stryker." 5 Iwata worked in the United States for a while before he
was relocated to Japan, where he claimed to have been
discriminatorily discharged pursuant to both Title VII and the
ADEA. 116 Upon termination, Iwata went back to the United States
and continued to live as a resident alien.' 17
The court examined both statutes and found that unless a
person was a United States citizen, he was not included in the
definition of "employee" if he worked abroad.' 18 Since the ADEA
provision defining "employee" is virtually identical to that of Title
VII, most of the court's analysis involved Title VII. Referring to
Title VII, the court said, "[s]pecifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) now
provides that 'with respect to employment in a foreign country,
such term [employee] includes an individual who is a citizen of the
United States."' 9 Thus, the court stated that the Act would not
apply unless the employee was a citizen of the United States and
the corporation was controlled by an American employer. 120 It did
not matter to the court that while Iwata was in the United States,
he was covered by the Act, but upon relocating, he no longer was

112 No. 93 C 1457, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3910, at *23 (citing J.I. Case Co., 617 F.

Supp. at 862; Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559).
113 59 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
114 Id. at 602.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.

118 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII so that the definition of

"employee" included U.S. citizens employed abroad.
superseded the Arabian decision. Id. at 603.

This change legislatively

119 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)) (emphasis in original).
120 The court never decided the issue of control because the fact of Iwata's non-

citizenship eliminated the need. Id. at 604.
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due to his citizenship status.
The cases above all addressed the concept of extraterritoriality
in conjunction with the ADEA or Title VII. Stepping away from
the focus on this combination and looking solely at the job situs
test in the context of labor law, stands the case of Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers International Union v. Mobil Oil (OCAW). 12 ' In
OCAW, the issue was whether the Texas right-to-work law could
be applied to bar a collective bargaining agreement provision for
U.S. seamen, hired mostly in Texas, but working on the high
"'
seas. 22
The Court held the Texas state law was inapplicable.'23
The Court discussed the type of test to be used in determining
which law applied. The majority adopted a job situs test,'24
whereas the concurrence did not think it necessary to determine
the appropriateness of a job situs test in this case. 25 The dissent,
on the other hand, wanted the Court to follow a place of decision
test. 126
Ultimately, the job situs test eliminated the
"unpredictability" of having to evaluate workers' contacts to a
jurisdiction and was found by the Court to be a more workable test
than the place of hiring test. 27 Although OCAW did not involve
the ADEA or Title VII, the Supreme Court determined that, in the
labor law context, the two benefits of predictability and
workability played a substantial role in adopting a job situs test.
IV. Analysis
A. Case Law
Given the precedent affirmed in Reyes-Gaona, that noncitizens working in the United States are protected by the ADEA
and Title VII, the affirmation of these cases would seem to be
favorable to Reyes-Gaona. 128
However, the Fourth Circuit
121 426 U.S. 407 (1976).
122 Id.at 410.
123 Id. at414,420.
124 Id. at

418-20.

125 Id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring).

Id. at 437 (Stewart, J., dissenting, "I believe that the place of hiring is the critical
factor in determining the choice of law ....
127 Id. at 419.
126

128 "I emphasize that the decision reached by the court in this case does not conflict
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distinguished Reyes-Gaona's case because Reyes-Gaona was not
yet working in the United States. The concurrence stated, "[h]ad
Reyes-Gaona been hired by NCGA, once he began work in this
country, the ADEA would have protected him from unlawful
employment discrimination."'' 29 This stands in stark contrast with
the Third Circuit's statement in Denty, that there was no difference
between a failure-to-hire case and a failure-to-promote case. 3 ° In
essence, the court in Reyes-Gaona was saying there could be
discrimination in the hiring process of H-2A workers. A worker
cannot be authorized to work in the United States until he is
offered a job, which, of course, will never happen if the employer
discriminates against foreign workers in the hiring process.
But what is the test to determine if a claim is extraterritorial in
nature in the labor context? Is it the prospective workplace? The
place of decision? Or, does the test change depending on if it is a
refusal-to-hire, a refusal-to-promote, or an unlawful discharge
claim? Did Reyes-Gaona, in his claim of discrimination, truly ask
the court to apply a federal law beyond its scope?
If Reyes-Gaona's claim demanded extraterritorial application
of the ADEA, any court would apply the strong presumption
against extraterritoriality as stated in Arabian, and finding no
explicit language in the statute or in the legislative history
speaking to the facts of this case, would rule against him. This is
what happened in the Fourth Circuit. "Notably missing from the
1984 amendments ... is any provision regulating the conduct at
issue here."'' The Fourth Circuit stated that Congress knew how
to expand the jurisdictional reach of a statute when it desired, and
that was not done with the provision at issue in Reyes-Gaona.32
'
with the generally accepted principle that statutes affording protection from employment
discrimination, such as Title VII and the ADEA, apply to foreign nationals who are
legally employed in the United States." Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 866 (Motz, J.,
concurring) (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) ("We agree that
aliens are protected under [Title VII]."); Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian Am. Oil Co., 892
F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that Congress intended to "provide Title VII
coverage to aliens employed within the United States"); O'Loughlin v. Pritchard Corp.,
972 F. Supp. 1352, 1363-64 (D. Kan. 1997) (The ADEA "in general protects noncitizens
of the United States from unlawful discrimination.")).
129 Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 866 (Motz, J., concurring).
130

See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.

131Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 865.
132 Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991)).
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However, the above analysis begins with the assumption that
Congress did not think that the job situs test was the test for
extraterritoriality. If Congress considered the workplace the
proper focus (and the case law from the time of the 1984
amendment undoubtedly supports a job situs test), then there was
no need to address any situation involving a domestic workplace,
such as in the case of Reyes-Gaona. In other words, there was no
need to distinguish a hiring case, with the workplace in U.S.
territory, from a case where the plaintiff was already hired and
working in the United States.
In sum, Reyes-Gaona's claim hinged on the court applying the
correct test for determining extraterritoriality. If the job situs test
remains valid in the labor context, then Reyes-Gaona's claim does
not even invoke extraterritoriality because his job would have
been in North Carolina. If, however, the job situs test is rejected,
his claim fails because he was an applicant applying from abroad.
Before its amendment in 1984, many courts held that the
ADEA had no extraterritorial application at all. 3 3 If the preamendment definition of "employee," "an individual employed by
an employer,"'' 34 had been interpreted to cover all U.S. citizens,
then the fear is perhaps understandable that such a broad definition
would open the door to Americans employed overseas by foreign
employers to claim that they were also covered. This last situation
would certainly infringe upon the laws of another nation because it
would require foreign employers to obey U.S. laws for their U.S.
workers. This would clearly violate the Supreme Court's canon of
law that one country cannot impose its labor standards on
another. 135
Thus, the added language of the amendment, "[t]he term
'employee' includes any individual who is a citizen of the United
States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign
country," is interpreted to have given limited extraterritorial
application to a statute with no extraterritorial reach. 136 For this
reason, one has a good idea of what is considered extraterritorial.
That is, applying U.S. labor laws to a U.S. citizen working for a
133

See discussion supra Part III.D. I.

134 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1994).
135 Arabian, 499 U.S. at 248.
136

See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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U.S. company abroad is considered extraterritorial, but, due to the
amendment, a citizen is now protected under both the ADEA and
Title VII. However, there is no precedent dictating whether a
claim by a foreign applicant, such as Reyes-Gaona, applying for a
job within the United States from abroad, should be considered
extraterritorial. The best one can do is analyze the cases described
above that invoke extraterritorial application of the law and
consider on what facts those decisions turned.
Distinguishing between pre- and post-amendment cases is not
particularly helpful since the 1984 ADEA amendment and the
1991 Title VII amendment merely give limited extraterritorial
scope to the Acts in a narrow factual situation. Since ReyesGaona's claim does not fit into the mold created by the
amendments, it hinges on which "test" is chosen to ascertain
whether a claim requires extraterritorial application of the law.
For Reyes-Gaona, a test that focuses on the workplace would
remove his case from the issue of extraterritorial application since
his prospective workplace was in the United States. However, the
Fourth Circuit declared that the Thomas line of cases, employing a
job situs test, merely "stands for the rather unremarkable
proposition that before 1984 the ADEA had no extraterritorial
application at all."' 3 7 "The fact that the ADEA did not apply in
those cases does not compel the conclusion that it does apply to
this one."' 38 If the test for extraterritoriality of the ADEA before
1984 was the workplace, why would this test change once the Act
was given limited extraterritorial application?
It is not clear which test should be used, if any. Lower courts
still look to the prospective workplace for extraterritoriality issues,
which indicates that the job situs test with regard to extraterritorial
application of the ADEA and Title VII is still very much alive.
Three cases, Gantchar,Hu, and Iwata, are examined below. They
are relevant to Reyes-Gaona because all three involved claims by
foreign nationals and because both Gantcharand Hu were hiring
cases. Those cases dealing with discrimination in the hiring
process were most useful to Reyes-Gaona because the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the precedent holding that a foreign national
discriminated against when already employed in the United States
137

Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 866.

138

Id. at 867 (Motz, J., concurring).
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was covered by the ADEA.'39 In addition to these three district
court cases, Lopez, a hiring case in which the Eleventh Circuit
applied pre-Amendment ADEA, is analyzed below. Once again,
distinguishing between pre- and post-amendment cases should not
serve as a basis for changing the extraterritoriality test.
The court in Gantchar held that the location of the workplace
determined whether extraterritorial application was being
requested. 4 ' The case dealt with both foreign nationals and
Americans, and included refusal-to-hire claims under Title VII and
the ADEA.14' Notably, the district court devoted a good portion of
its opinion to determining what percentage of the workplace was
in the United States, in international territory, and on foreign land,
despite the consensus that the plaintiffs were applying for Londonbased positions. 42 This case, if not standing for a "workplace
test" due to the ambulatory nature of the work (as with flight
attendants), at least shows that a refusal-to-hire in the context of
extraterritoriality will not be dismissed solely because the
application process takes place abroad. In fact, with the number of
plaintiffs involved, it is not clear from the facts of Gantcharwhere
the application process occurred. Because the plaintiffs were
making claims under statutes enacted to eliminate discrimination
in the workplace, the emphasis on the workplace seems
reasonable. It provides the predictability and the workability
acknowledged
by the Supreme Court in OCAW as benefits of a job
43
situs test. 1
44
Hu shows that courts still think the workplace test is valid.'

139 Id. (Motz, J., concurring) (citing with approval Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 95 (1973), Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian Am. Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271, 1273
(5th Cir. 1990), and O'Loughlin v. Pritchard Corp., 972 F. Supp. 1352, 1363-64 (D.
Kan. 1997), which held that legally employed foreign nationals were protected from
unlawful discrimination in the United States). See supra Part III.D.2.
140 No. 93-C1457, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3910, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1995).
However, ambulatory workers "might be considered to have a work station in more than
one country." Id. at *22 (citing Wolf v. J.1. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 862 (E.D. Wisc.
1985)). See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
141 Id. at *1.

142 Id. at *18-21.

143 See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
144 76 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). See supranotes 96-100 and accompanying
text.
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If Hu had been a U.S. citizen, his case would have fallen under the
limited extraterritorial reach of the ADEA in applying for the jobs
in Hong Kong and Beijing. However, Hu was not a U.S. citizen at
the time he applied, although he was residing legally in the United
States. 45 The situs of
the application process, once again, was
14 6
case.
this
in
irrelevant
Hu could also be seen as an example that a rigid reading of the
ADEA results in strange outcomes. Imagine X, a foreign national
who is a legal U.S. resident employed in the United States at a
U.S. corporation with his co-workers, A and B, who are U.S.
citizens. X, A, and B accept promotions entailing their transfer to
their company's office in France. Now, applying Hu, the very
same company is given the go-ahead to discriminate with
impunity against X, but not A and B, because the extraterritoriality
provision only applies to U.S. citizens, and the fact that X was
hired, employed, and promoted in the United States does not
prevent a conclusion that the conduct is extraterritorial.
Another example of continuing use of the workplace test for
extraterritoriality is Iwata v. Stryker Corp.147 It is also an example,
like Hu, of a discrepancy in the treatment of U.S. citizens and
legally residing foreign nationals due to the latter's noncitizen
status and a narrow reading of the ADEA and Title VII. Iwata, a
Japanese citizen, legally residing and working in the United States,
relocated with his corporation to Japan where he allegedly
experienced discrimination. The court found that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over his claims under Title VII and the ADEA
because the relocation exempted him from the definition of
"employee" when he became a foreign national working abroad.' 48
It seems strange that a foreign national working in the United
States cannot be discriminated against here, but can be
discriminated against abroad while working for the same
company.
As mentioned earlier, there is no precedent with factual
circumstances similar to Reyes-Gaona. All the precedent involves
workplaces abroad and thus applies a test for extraterritoriality that
145 Id. at 477.
146

Id.

147

59 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999).

148

See supra text accompanying notes 113-20.
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focuses on the location of the workplace. Since the Fourth Circuit
stated that the "reverse situation" did not mandate a workplace
situs test, 149 perhaps the Fourth Circuit was saying that what
matters is that any part of the employment occurs abroad,
regardless of whether it be the application process or the
termination. Such a conclusion, however, is not clear.
According to the Fourth Circuit, a case such as Lopez 15 ° is not
relevant because the pre-amendment ADEA was applied. As
stated earlier, distinguishing the proper analysis for
extraterritoriality based on whether a case is pre- or postamendment does not seem useful if the 1984 ADEA amendment
merely extended extraterritorial coverage to Americans working
for United States companies abroad. The logic of the workplace
test should remain the same whether or not Americans are covered
abroad. Further, Lopez is relevant to Reyes-Gaona because Lopez
was allegedly discriminated against in the hiring process.
According to Lopez and the other cases decided around that time,
Congress was concerned with domestic conditions. This
proposition stems from the language of Arabian and remains
strong.151 Under this premise, it makes sense that an American
worker was not covered prior to the amendment because a foreign
country's laws could protect a U.S. citizen. In Denty, for example,
the Third Circuit stated: "We reject the EEOC's argument that by
failing to apply the ADEA extraterritorially here, Denty will fall
into a 'black hole.' To the contrary,

. . .

he is protected by British

law."' 5 2 However, the age of the workforce in the United States is
undoubtedly a domestic condition and the hiring of such a
workforce is a function of the determined workplace, whether
current or prospective.
Not only does Denty serve as a reminder that Congress is
149 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
150 Lopez v. Pan Am World Services, 813 F.2d 1118 (1lth Cir. 1987).
151 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("[U]nless there is 'the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,' we must presume it 'is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions."') (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949)).
152 Denty v. SmithKline Beacham, 109 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 820 (1997).("The fact that British law does not protect individuals forty years
of age or older from discrimination is not our concern.").
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primarily concerned with domestic conditions, but also the Third
Circuit in Denty concluded that there was no difference between a
failure-to-hire case and a failure-to-promote case. If a hiring case
is considered no different from a promotion or discharge case,
then Reyes-Gaona becomes a member of the class of noncitizens
described in Espinoza and O'Loughlin already working in the
United States that are protected by the ADEA and Title VII.
Following this logic, Reyes-Gaona's failure-to-hire claim and a
noncitizen's failure-to-promote or unlawful discharge claim within
the United States should all be treated the same-as claims made
under the ADEA which do not invoke extraterritoriality.
B. The FederalH-2A Program
The Fourth Circuit relied on the combination of three critical
elements in its holding: 1) a foreign national applicant, 2) applying
abroad, 3) for a job in the United States. 5 3 Because Congress did
not address a situation specifically involving these three elements,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned, Congress must not have wanted to
include any person satisfying all three of these elements within the
ADEA's coverage. However, the Fourth Circuit arrived at this
conclusion based on several perplexing, conclusory remarks in
Reyes-Gaona. For example, in rejecting the Thomas line of cases,
the court made the following two conclusions:
Notably missing from the 1984 amendments, however, is any
provision regulating the conduct at issue here. Congress
explicitly gave the ADEA extraterritorial application with
respect to certain U.S. citizens while simultaneously declining to
extend coverage to foreign nationals like Reyes-Gaona ....
And
the doctrine of expressio unis est exclusio alterius instructs that
where a law expressly describes a particular situation to which it
shall apply, what was54 omitted or excluded was intended to be
omitted or excluded.1

First, regarding this language, how apparent is it that the
amendment "simultaneously declin[ed] to extend coverage to

153 Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
10008 (Oct. 29, 2001) ("[The Act certainly could not have reached the even more
attenuated situation of a foreign national applying in a foreign country for work in the
United States.").
154

Id.
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foreign nationals"?'55 True, it is not clear whether Congress
156
passed the 1984 amendment to clarify the ADEA or to change it,
but either way, if Congress saw that the courts were applying a
workplace test for extraterritoriality, there was no reason to
address Reyes-Gaona's situation. Congress quite reasonably could
have assumed that Reyes-Gaona was covered, but the Fourth
Circuit ignored this possibility.
Second, the Reyes-Gaona court stated that the amendment
"expressly describe[d] a particular situation" of limited
extraterritorial reach when an American is working abroad.157
However, that does not necessarily mean that Reyes-Gaona was
intentionally omitted from the Act's scope if it was assumed that
his claim would never fall within the scope of extraterritoriality
due to the prospective domestic workplace.
Other perplexing remarks by the court include the conclusion
that the "simple submission of a resume abroad" would have
"staggering consequences for American companies" because the
ADEA would be expanded "to cover millions of foreign nationals
who file an overseas application."' 58 This remark is unfounded.
The possibility of rejected applicants to programs similar to the H2A program being in the "millions" is an exaggeration revealed by
the Department of Labor Statistics. 5 9

156

Id. (emphasis added).
See supra note 83.

157

Reyes-Gaona, 250 F.3d at 865.

155

at 866. With respect to agricultural workers, agribusiness tends to hire illegal
immigrants and complain of the conditions imposed in order to hire H-2A workers.
"[T]he reality is that hiring non-complaining undocumented workers is cheaper. The
result is that in the $200 billion annual agricultural industry employing 1.2 million
farmworkers, 624,000 are undocumented, only . . .28,560 H-2A guest-worker visas
[were obtained] in 1999, and close to 50,000 in 2000." Patrick Osio Jr., New Urgency
for Immigration Reform, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 23, 2001, at B9, available
at LEXIS, News Library, San Diego Union-Tribune File.
158 Id.

159 Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, Reyes-Gaona (No. 00-1963)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., OWS
INFO. BULLETIN No. 03-01, H-2A SUMMARY REPORT at ii (2001)):
Most of these programs are subject to specific, annual, numerical limits, as well
as complex and varied eligibility rules, which further limit the number of
potential beneficiaries. While there is no specific limit on the number of H-2A
visas that may be issued each year, in fiscal year 2000, the number of jobs
which agricultural employers sought to fill with H-2A guestworkers was 48,480

2001]

DISCRIMINATION IN THE HIRING PROCESS

Further, the Fourth Circuit decision ignored the increasing
internationalization of the U.S. labor force and the globalization of
the economy. More and more employers use federal employment
visa programs to recruit foreign citizens to work in the United
States. 6° And, because there are several federal visa programs
contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which approve
and facilitate the process of hiring from abroad, Reyes-Gaona has
significant implications for the U.S. labor force-it seems that an
employer may now discriminate with impunity. 161 Not only could
the Fourth Circuit's decision apply to age discrimination, but
based on statutorily similar language in Title VII, Reyes-Gaona
discriminating
also implicates the regulation of recruiting practices
162
well.
as
religion
and
color,
race,
gender,
based on
The federal programs require that employment of aliens "will
not adversely affect the ... working conditions of workers in the
United States similarly employed."' 163 This now seems impossible
if any employer chooses to manipulate its workforce by recruiting
abroad in a way compliant with Reyes-Gaona. It already seems
that many American companies prefer to hire foreign candidates
because they are willing to work for lower wages than the
American workers." 6
In short, the Fourth Circuit justifies its decision with a
presumption against extraterritoriality, citing a concern for
imposing U.S. labor standards abroad. However, there is little
reason to believe that Mexico's foreign sovereignty would be

and the number of jobs approved reached 44,017.
Id. "The H-2B program only allows up to 66,000 visas to be issued each year." Id.
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(B) (2000)).
160 See generally, Mary Beth Sheridan, Employers Look Beyond Borders for
Prospects: Use of Temporary Visa ProgramsBooming, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2001, at
Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, Washington Post File ("Despite the economic
slowdown, . . .demand for the temporary workers appears to have stayed relatively
strong.").
161 Appellant's Petition at 18, Reyes-Gaona (No. 00-1963).
162 Id.
163 8 U.S.C. §§

1188(a)(1)(B), 1182(n)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).

I64 Joyce Lain Kennedy, Talent Overlooked in Youth, H-1B Era, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 13, 2000, at IL (commenting that fewer than half of computer-science
graduates actually get programming jobs because employers find hiring through the HI B program more profitable).
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undermined by preventing U.S. corporations from discriminatorily
manipulating its U.S. labor force through its foreign hiring
process. Rather, it is the U.S. workforce that is affected by such
discrepancies in the hiring process.
V. Conclusion
In order to protect U.S. citizens working in the United States,
their foreign counterparts should be given equal rights. This
would deter employers from taking advantage of foreign workers
to the detriment of both foreigners and U.S. workers.
The test for extraterritoriality is key in Reyes-Gaona because if
the test remains the location of the workplace, as it most certainly
was before the 1984 amendment and as it arguably still is, then
Reyes-Gaona's claim should have succeeded-there was no
dispute that Del-Al's policy could not be instituted within the
United States. For a job within the United States, not hiring
workers over the age of forty unless they are previous employees
plainly violates the rights of U.S. citizens not to be discriminated
against in the hiring process because of age. The uncertainty of
the test for extraterritoriality should be clarified as the
internationalization of the U.S. workforce increases. If the federal
government is allowing U.S. employers to find needed labor
abroad, the rules for doing so should not be in question.
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